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Abstract 
 
One conjecture in the theory of incentives is that incentives based on broader outcomes may be 
better at motivating agents than incentives based on narrow measures. We designed an experi-
ment to test these hypotheses using a “prospective randomized evaluation procedure” (PREP). 
We then apply PREP to training programs as typically funded by donors of economic devel-
opment assistance. We randomly assigned 274 participating entrepreneurs in the Philippines to 
one of 26, simultaneous, one-day, training classes in marketing. Trainers were given cash incen-
tives based on the average score of their “students” on a standardized test containing an alterna-
tive number of questions, which were randomly assigned to each class. We then examined out-
comes based on student satisfaction ratings of the trainer. Our results suggest that incentives 
based on broad outcomes are more effective than incentives based on narrow outcomes. We con-
clude with ways to improve our approach as well as with a discussion of the implications for 
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1  Introduction 
It is widely conjectured (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1993) that perverse incentives are the cause of 
underperformance at the level of the individual, the firm and the economy.  The theoretical work 
on incentives has highlighted how incentives based on indicators, when not closely related to the 
objectives that matter most, can be distracting rather than motivating (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991). These concerns about incentives for teachers were voiced even before the theoretical 
advances by Murnane and Cohen (1986).  Our results suggest that, as theory predicts, incentives 
do have an effect on outcomes, but incentives based on narrow outcomes can be ineffective or 
even counterproductive. 
The statistical study of the impact of incentives, however, is limited by the fact that 
incentives vary endogenously and most analyses of ex post data suffer from problems caused by 
omitted variable bias, simultaneity bias and selection bias. For example, individuals destined to 
succeed may adopt better incentives than individuals less likely to do well.
2  Also there may sim-
ply not be enough institutional variation across units to examine some interesting hypotheses.   
  While these observations are relevant in a wide variety of applications, the present 
authors are particularly interested in the implications for technical assistance provided by bilat-
eral and multilateral donors. On the one hand, in recent years donors have become concerned 
that their assistance has not always been effective and, worse, that they don’t have the tools to 
assess their impact.
3 On the other hand, the amount of donor funding has been falling in real 
terms, making it more important than ever to have a way to evaluate aid performance for future 
improvement. 
In recent years, artificial experimental methods have entered the mainstream of economic 
analysis, with experimental papers now appearing regularly in all the major journals (e.g., Glae-
ser et al. 2000).  Indeed experimental economics has forced economists to rethink their cherished 
assumptions of rationality (e.g., Shiller 2004, Thaler 2000), and led to a gestalt shift in economic 
thought. In this paper, we present an experimental test in the context of donor training programs 
                                                 
2 By “adopt” we mean they may choose sharper incentive schemes within their firms, if the opportunities exist, or 
they may choose firms with sharper incentives schemes. 
3 There are signs that this situation may be changing. The Millennium Challenge Corp, set up by President Bush, has 
recently initiated a massive effort to introduce randomized trials as a means of evaluating its country programs 
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of the hypothesis that incentives only improve outcomes when based on broad measures of per-
formance. 
  We begin by describing what we call a “Prospective, Randomized Evaluation Procedure” 
(PREP) approach to evaluating donor development assistance.
4 We then present an application of 
PREP to technical assistance for the simple case of marketing workshops for small- and medium-
scale enterprise (SME) entrepreneurs in the Philippines. The central question was the whether the 
effectiveness of trainers was increased by providing them cash incentives. Incentives are pre-
sumed to have an effect on behavior but there are several concerns about the effect of incentives 
on teachers and trainers, or for that matter any activity where the true value of outcomes is diffi-
cult to measure (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, Prendergast 1999; Dixit 2001, Azfar 2002). To 
address these concerns we offered trainers financial incentives based on an objective measure of 
outcomes and compared their performance across groups.   
More recently, Eberts, Holleneck and Stone (2000) have shown that a school that intro-
duced merit pay based on student retention, improved its performance as measured by retention 
rates, but may have undermined performance more broadly defined. Their paper, however, 
involves the comparison of only two schools, making any clear inference difficult. Our results, 
based on 26 training classes using an identical syllabus but trainer-varying incentives, suggest 
that, as theory predicts, incentives do have an effect on outcomes but, if inappropriately 
designed, can be ineffective or even counterproductive.  Our results resonate with the concurrent 
work done by Glewwe et al. (2003) who find that in Kenya the provision of monetary incentives 
to teachers only led to short-term improvements in student performance.   
Finally we offer some methodological suggestions on how to conduct better a study like 
this one in a way that produces clearer results in the future and then make some policy recom-
mendations for funders of development assistance. 
2  Evaluating the impact of trainer incentives 
To test our hypothesis that incentives only improve outcomes when based on broad measures of 
performance we conducted a prospective random evaluation procedure (PREP) in The Philip-
pines. As its name implies, PREP treats the evaluation of technical assistance in the same way 
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that a pharmaceutical company might use clinical trials to assess drug effectiveness.
5 There are 
several challenges for its application to donor interventions (ignoring the obvious need to con-
vince a donor of the efficacy of the approach to begin with), however. Among these is, first, the 
difficulty of structuring the application’s treatment design to be amenable to randomization.  In 
the case of decentralization, freedom of information reform, or tax reform, for example, politics 
and equity
6 if not practicality make it difficult to simply divide the country into a sufficient num-
ber of groups receiving varied treatments. Nonetheless, it is clear that the two insights of pro-
perly designed control groups and prospective randomization could be powerful techniques to 
evaluate the effectiveness of donor interventions.  
As a concrete test of the PREP approach and one where the above concerns were easy to 
avoid, we picked the field of donor-funded training. Donors have been paying for training under 
the name of capacity building and human capital investment for decades and for a wide variety 
of topics, both economic and political. The training we selected was of SME managers in strate-
gic marketing.
7 Our evaluation was focused on the impact of trainer incentives on student out-
comes. We offered different groups of trainers different incentives and compared outcomes 
across groups using a variety of alternative indicators.  
2.1  Theoretical background and implementation design 
We begin by providing some theoretical background for this exercise in terms of the theory of 
incentives, and the relevance of these ideas for donors of development assistance. 
Theory and relevance of performance-based incentives. That monetary incentives matter 
and have an effect on behavior follows easily from the assumptions of rational choice and utility 
maximization. The early formal work on the theory of incentives showed that incentives could 
improve performance and empirical work on the provision of incentives in firms showed that 
incentives did improve performance.
8  However, what these theoretical and empirical studies had 
in common was that the “principal” could observe something closely related to the principal’s 
interest—in the present example the “principal” would be the aid donor of the trainings and the 
                                                 
5 For an introduction to randomized trials, see Greenberg et al. (2004) and on how to apply PREP, see Azfar and 
Zinnes (2003). 
6 In fact, there is the analogous concern of withholding treatment of a potentially effective experimental drug from a 
sub-group where it is believed with high probability that the drug would be effective. 
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observable outcome would be the quality of the trainer’s teaching.  Changing the premise that 
outcomes are observable can call the value of incentives into question since one can no longer be 
certain what effect—positive or negative—the incentives are having. 
Subsequent theoretical work has in fact shown that if the principal cannot observe 
whether his objectives are being maximized, then incentives can be distracting rather than moti-
vating (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), i.e, lead to unwanted side-effects. The issue has also 
been highlighted in policy debates on subjects like education where observable variables like 
scores on standardized tests are thought by many experts to distract rather than motivate teach-
ers. Teachers may “teach for the test” in response to such incentives, they may encourage stu-
dents to concentrate on doing well on items the teachers’ incentives are based on, and, in extreme 
cases, may even lead teachers to turn a blind eye toward a cheating student (Jacob and Levitt 
2003). 
The theory of incentives also suggests that incentives based on broader measures of per-
formance are more likely to motivate “agents” (the trainers in the present case) toward the 
objectives of their principal than incentives based on narrower measures of performance. To test 
this theory we offered trainers incentives based on outcomes of different breadth.  How this was 
done in described in the next section. From a policy perspective, we are also interested in what 
type of trainer incentives should donors use to maximize the effectiveness of their aid. 
Experimental design of the PREP application to trainers. The trainings were conducted 
by the Institute for Small Scale Industries (ISSI) at the University of The Philippines. ISSI 
routinely conducts trainings for SME managers and proved to be a good partner.  We chose 
strategic marketing as the subject to be taught because ISSI indicated it was a popular topic and 
would make it easier to attract course participants. 
The training was done in two stages. First, ISSI recruited 30 trainers from a large 
applicant pool. These trainers were subsequently trained to train the SME managers.
9 All trainers 
took an exam at the end of this training. Over the subsequent week, trainers were asked to give 
trial presentations of how they would teach from a common syllabus and their performance as 
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teachers was graded by ISSI staff.
10  We would use later this exam score and trial presentation 
grade as two controls when assessing incentive effects on their performance. Finally, though we 
began with 30 trainers, one trainer left during the training and another did not show up for the 
trial training. Both were taken out of the sample. Of the remaining 28 trainers, we removed the 
one who got the lowest score, leaving us with 27 trainers. 
The 27 trainers were randomly placed into one of six incentive groups according to Table 
1. Eighteen trainers were provided incentives to teach a one-day class where the incentive was 
based on the percentage of responses the students in their class would answer correctly on an 
exam to be administered at the end of the training. Of these eighteen trainers, the performance of 
six would be based on an exam of 20 questions, six would be based on an exam of 40 questions, 
and six would be based on an exam of 80 questions. The possible monetary payoffs to trainers 
depended on the average exam score of the students in their class as listed in Appendix B and 
varied from 0 to 10,000 Pesos (approximately 0 to 200 U.S. dollars). Eight trainers did not have 
incentives based on their students’ performance. These trainers got a fixed, extra payment of 
3,000 Pesos, which we guessed would be the average amount of the incentive payment.
11 One of 
these eighteen trainers failed to show up on the day of the training, reducing the number of 
trainers in Group 1 by one trainer. 
Table 1: Randomization matrix for PREP Training Study 
Group Incentives  Number of 
questions on test 
Number of 
classrooms/trainers 
1 No 20  2*   
2 No 40  3 
3 No 80  3 
4 Yes 20  6 
5 Yes 40  6 
6 Yes 80  6 
*In fact, 3 had been planned, but one trainer did not show up. 
One week before the training, we mailed each trainer their incentive package and the 
exam questions their students had to answer. Having this material in advance allowed trainers 
time to take the incentive scheme into account while preparing to teach their sessions. Thus, our 
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conjecture was that trainers who were given incentives based on the answers to 20 questions 
would likely plan to teach in a way that communicated the answer to the twenty questions, but 
probably without creating a broader understanding of the material.  Trainers who were assigned 
80 questions, on the other hand, faced the choice of either communicating the answers to 80 
questions or conveying a broad understanding of the material. Given the greater difficulty of 
making their students learn and remember 80 answers (as compared to 20 answers), they may 
have preferred developing an understanding of the material.  Trainers were asked not to discuss 
any information regarding their incentive package or the exams they were to teach to with other 
trainers to minimize spillover effects (see Appendix B). The likelihood of this was low to begin 
with since trainer selection was such that trainers would have never met prior to the day of the 
training. 
For the second step, ISSI advertisements and direct marketing succeeded in registering 
several hundred course participants. In the event, a total of 274 participants comprising SME 
owners or senior managers showed up for the training. They were randomly placed into 26 
classes of approximately equal size. All of these “students” provided some basic information and 
took a pretest of 20 questions. Students then had a five-hour training on strategic marketing (with 
a lunch break). This was followed by a multiple-choice test of varying length.  Students got time 
proportional to the number of questions they had to answer. All students then answered two 
essay questions.  Finally, we asked several questions about their rating of the trainer as a teacher, 
whether the training would change how they conducted their business, and whether they would 
be willing to pay for subsequent trainings.  Which Incentives Work?       7
2.2  Measures of outcomes 
The success of an evaluation depends on the construction of the appropriate indicators of out-
comes and performance. The trainers were graded prior to giving their class on their answers to 
the multiple choice test, essay questions, and graded on teaching ability by ISSI experts. A com-
posite measure of these scores was used as the trainer quality variable.
12  We used several differ-
ent indicators to measure training outcomes. These included student scores on: multiple choice 
tests, essay questions, satisfaction ratings of the trainer, whether the training changed the way the 
students would do business, and the willingness to pay for subsequent trainings. 
Our experience as students and educators has been that the quality of teaching signifi-
cantly affects learning and the value of the lesson.  An obvious way to check for the validity of 
trainer performance variables is to correlate the performance variables with the trainer score. We 
calculated the bivariate correlations of the performance variables with the trainer quality varia-
ble, and also ran robust, univariate regressions to examine if these correlations were robust 
(Table 2).  In each case only the satisfaction rating variable showed a correlation with the trainer 
quality variable. We also found that the satisfaction ratings were more correlated with compon-
ents of the trainer score variable than were the other performance variables.
13 For this reason, we 
only used satisfaction ratings as a performance variable when investigating the determinants of 
trainer performance.  The other performance variables seem to contain sufficient noise so that 
even variation in trainer quality does not have a statistically measurable effect on them.
14 This 
makes it a priori less likely that a variable, like the incentives we offer the trainers, would have a 
statistically measurable impact on these indicators of performance. 
The satisfaction training variable is the composite score of the questions we asked the 
students to determine their satisfaction of their trainer. The questions themselves and the com-
posite indicator are presented in Appendix A. These questions are similar to satisfaction ratings 
used in American universities. We had some initial concern about the relevance of the questions 
to the Philippines context but found that ISSI actually uses a similar approach. Questions 
                                                 
12 The variable, Trainer Quality is a standardized, composite indicator, created by first standardizing and then aver-
aging the trainer’s scores in the multiple-choice and essay tests and the mini-lecture. Scores were collected before 
the teaching sessions. 
13 These results are not shown in to save space but are available from the authors. 
14 As discussed below, had this level of noise been anticipated, it could have been partly corrected by setting a larger 
sample size. Normally, such problems can be avoided by administering a pre-test to establish inter alia the adequate 
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addressed how clearly the lecturer spoke, whether she was well-prepared, etc. and a general 
question asking for the overall rating of the lecturer. As expected, all the indicator components 
were significantly correlated with each other. An aggregate score based on an average of all 
these ratings is used as one measure of trainer performance. 
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Willingness to pay (fixed value)  0.07 
0.35 









Regressions are all univariate.  *At the 90-percent level of confidence. 
 
2.3  The determinants of trainer performance 
We now begin our examination of the determinants of the performance variables that seem to 
capture the quality of teaching: satisfaction ratings. But first let us recap the theoretical predic-
tions. 
Theory predicts that incentives can improve performance but may also encourage trainers 
to try to “game the outcome” by teaching to the tests, which, recall, were provided to the trainers 
in advance and contained from 20 to 80 questions. Students may also find they are not learning 
useful material for their businesses and give poor satisfaction ratings for trainers. This would be 
particularly true for trainers whose incentives were based on 20 questions. Trainers, whose 
incentives were based on their students’ answers to 80 questions, may find it best to teach well 
and impart useful knowledge, rather than focus on the answers to specific questions. This is 
                                                 
15 A robust regression down-weights outliers and re-estimates regressions based on the new weights. It then identi-
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because the best strategy to impart the knowledge on 80 topics may be to provide broader-based 
knowledge, rather than attempting to cram 80 “facts” into a student’s head in a short period. 
  We now examine the determinants of trainer performance as measured by the sat-
isfaction rating. The results are presented in Table 3. Ordinary least squares would mis-estimate 
the standard errors on the group level variables if, as is likely, the error terms were correlated 
across groups. The estimation method we use is regression with the cluster command in STATA. 
This method controls for correlated error terms within groups and calculates robust standard 
errors. As student’s ability may affect their enjoyment of the course, all regressions control for 
the student’s pretest score. The variable is generally insignificant. Omitting it does not substan-
tially change the results.  
Model 1 in Table 3 is a simple regression of the satisfaction rating on whether or not the 
trainer had incentives. The coefficient is positive but insignificant, allowing no clear inference on 
the effect of incentives on the quality of teaching.  This result remains valid in Model 2 when we 
control for gender of the student and whether the student owns his firm.
16  This result seems to 
give credence to the frequently aired concern that giving incentives based on multiple choice 
questions would simply induce trainers to “teach to the test”. The students—the SME managers 
who had come to take the course to improve their business practices—may, therefore, be dissat-
isfied with such narrowly focused instruction. We had anticipated this issue and planned to test 
for this concern. Our strategy was to offer incentives on outcomes of different breadths and we, 
therefore, gave different trainers incentives based on 20, 40 or 80 questions (see Table 1). This 
allows us to test whether broader-based incentives are more motivating. 
In Models 3 and 4 we test the role of the broadness of the outcome measure on the effec-
tiveness of incentives by varying the number of questions on the trainer’s students’ exam. These 
models include a dummy variable for the presence or absence of trainer incentives, the number 
of questions, their interaction term, and trainer quality. Variables are transformed to allow an 
easier interpretation of the coefficients.
17 
                                                 
16 Other variables like age were tried but turned out to be statistically insignificant and led to a large reduction in the 
number of observations. 
17 Variables are transformed in the following way. Incentives is a dummy variable equal to 1 if incentives were 
given and 0 if not. Questions is created using the linear transform, (Examsize-40)/20, where Examsize indicates the 
number of questions (20, 40 or 80) in the multiple-choice exam the student received. This makes interpreting the 
coefficient easier––because it has round number values of -1 at 20 questions, 0 at 40 questions, and 2 at 80 ques-
tions. The variable, Trainer Quality is described in Footnote 12. Which Incentives Work?       10
Here, we see that increasing the number of questions has a clear negative effect. One pos-
sible interpretation of this is that students do not like answering 80 questions and let their frustra-
tions out when giving their satisfaction ratings of the trainer. Since educators or policy makers 
are typically not concerned about these short-term frustrations, if this was the reason for the 
question effect, then it can be discounted. We proceed by making this “frustration” assumption 
and will turn to other interpretations later. 
Table 3: The determinants of trainer performance, as measured by satisfaction ratings  
Dependant variable
1: Composite satisfaction rating (Mean= 24.62, Standard deviation= 3.20) 
                                                  Model
1  Name of explanatory variable 
1 2  3  4 


















2 No Yes  No  Yes 
Number of observations      172  162  172  162 
Adjusted R-squared   0.02  -0.01  0.13  0.10 
Notes: Estimation of regression has standard errors adjusted for within-group correlations. Absolute value of robust 
t-statistics are below coefficients.  * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.  (No coefficient is significant at 10% 
level). 
1 All regressions include the student’s pre-training score and control for trainer quality as described in Footnote 12. 
2 Additional student controls are gender and whether the student is the firm owner. 
3 Higher values are better. 
The term of interest in these models is the interaction term of incentives and the number 
of questions. This term is positive and significant (P=0.033), suggesting that, regardless of the 
interpretation of the direct effect of the trainer’s performance maximand, incentives based on 
more questions are in fact more effective at raising student’s satisfaction ratings than incentives 
based on fewer questions. The transformation of these variables allows us to easily interpret the 
coefficient on the interaction term. At 40 questions, the impact of incentives is simply the coeffi-
cient on incentives (an insignificant 0.32). At 20 questions, the impact is 0.32-0.59=-0.27 (also 
insignificant). At 80 questions, the impact is 0.32+2*0.59=1.50 (significant P=0.01). It is worth Which Incentives Work?       11
re-emphasizing the point that trainers knew the 20, 40, and 80 questions, respectively, a week 
before the teaching session, and so could have planned to teach for the test.  
We also ran another set of regressions of satisfaction ratings on incentives separately for 
groups which answered 20, 40 and 80 questions. These regressions are presented in Table 4. 
There was no significant effect of incentives on performance when measured by the student’s 
answers to 20 or 40 questions. For groups with 80 questions, incentives have a positive and sig-
nificant effect on satisfaction ratings. The magnitude of the effect is not small. Incentives 
improve performance by 40 percent of the standard deviation of the satisfaction rating measure. 
Table 4: The determinants of trainer performance, as measured by satisfaction ratings.  
Dependant variable:




1  2 3 4 5 6 
Number of questions  20  40  80  20  40  80 
Constant  29.266  27.743 21.333 29.283 25.185 24.106 
-2.041 -0.5  1.428  -1.851  -0.775  1.376  Incentives 
(1.27) (0.99)  (3.26)*  (1.15)  (1.33)  (2.79)* 
Additional student 
controls
1  No No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  58  54  60  55  52  55 
Adjusted R
2  0.04  0.11 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.01 
Notes: Regression estimated with standard errors adjusted for within-group correlations. Absolute values of robust t-
statistics are below coefficients. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.  (No coefficient is significant at 10% 
level) 
1 All regressions include student’s pre-training score.  Additional student controls are gender and whether the stu-
dent is the firm owner. 
2 All regressions control for trainer quality as assessed in the mini lecture and the trainer’s score on exam questions. 
3 Higher values are better. 
 
How can we interpret these results?  It appears that incentives do improve performance 
but only if based on 80 questions. This accords with the modern view that incentives can be 
useful, but only if based on a broad measure of success.   
  As always, some caveats bear making. First, it is important to remember that if the nega-
tive coefficient on the number of student exam questions is interpreted differently, for instance, 
as “teachers teach badly if they feel they have to cover too much material”, then the results pre-
sented here would have to be reinterpreted. In this case, an alternative trainer incentive maxi-
mand would be more appropriate. For these and other reasons, it is evident with the benefit of 
hindsight that there is scope for refining our methodology in order to get clearer results. Second, Which Incentives Work?       12
a larger sample size at the level of each group would have allowed for more subtle testing and to 
detect weaker incentive effects. The next section explores the lessons we have learned from this 
PREP application that will help refine future such studies. 
3  Lessons learned and conclusion 
The first predictable lesson is “collect more data”. While this is always true, we seem to have 
erred on the side of collecting too little data in the sense that the marginal usefulness of more 
data would have quite high. We did in fact try to collect more data. We had specified a larger 
number of course participants than eventually appeared on the day of the training (450 rather 
than 274). Our local collaborator, ISSI, tried hard with phone calls and advertisements in news-
papers and even television to increase enrollments but with limited success. Likewise, budgetary 
and time restrictions prevented our conducting another set of trainings in other major Philippine 
cities.  
We also erred by assuming that there would be less individual-level “noise” than there 
actually was in all the variables other than the multiple choice scores. Normally pre-tests could 
have alleviated this risk by helping to definitively establish the necessary sample size. The pre-
sence of these individual-level factors, together with the small number of observations in each 
classroom, made all the performance variables, other than satisfaction ratings, noisy indicators of 
the quality of teaching. Had we been able to anticipate this problem—say, from a pre-test, we 
would have conducted one or two trainings where the entire population of students was taught by 
the same trainer. Responses on the willingness to pay for more trainings from this trainer, 
satisfaction ratings of this trainer’s performance, and statements about whether these trainings 
would affect the way business would be conducted could be used to control for (purge) indi-
vidual student-level effects. However, we should not overstate the expected effectiveness of such 
a method.  For example, we did anticipate this problem for the test-scores variable and gave the 
students an exam prior to conduct the trainings. Cleaning the post-training score using the pre-
training exam score did not significantly improve the performance of the test-score variable. 
Another lesson relates to the appropriate incentives to motivate trainers. We found that 
some of the trainers were motivated by the desire to work for ISSI or USAID in the future—even 
though we had explicitly stated this was a one-off project, and there were no future plans for col-Which Incentives Work?       13
laboration with ISSI.
18 Such motivations could easily drown out the monetary incentives we had 
provided. Several possible solutions could be considered to remedy this problem. First, one could 
provide much larger financial incentives.  Second, one could employ an experimental design that 
is semi-blind so as to prevent (in the present case) the experimenter (i.e., the authors) and ISSI 
from learning the trainers’ true performance. Finally, one could have required ISSI to sign an 
agreement not to hire any of the trainers for say three years. In the latter two cases, the strategy is 
to convince the trainers ex ante that the authors and ISSI have credibly pre-committed to having 
no future plans to collaborate with them. 
We should, perhaps, also have had a group of trainers rewarded on the basis of scores on 
essay questions and multiple choice tests. This would have substantially broadened the basis for 
incentives. A comparison between this group and the other groups would have been instructive. 
Unfortunately, funding did not permit this option. There are other methodological improvements 
we would have liked to use. The essay question should have been temporally administered ran-
domly, either before or after the multiple-choice questions to control for the “test fatigue” effect. 
Likewise, several student controls measured before the trainings would have been helpful, such 
as whether students had previously participated in training programs (with or without donor 
sponsorship), years in business (which would also proxy for age), and expected willingness to 
pay for the course. 
In terms of policy advice on offering incentives, our results suggest that only incentives 
based on broadly defined outcomes are likely to motivate better outcomes. This corresponds with 
theoretical conjectures, concerns expressed in the education literature, and concurrent empirical 
work. However, we must end on a note of calling for more research on this subject before defini-
tive policy-reform conclusions can be drawn. More studies structured with the improvements we 
have suggested here are needed in more countries to develop a clear understanding on how expli-
cit monetary incentives motivate teachers and trainers.  
On a more general note, there is an enormous push in the donor community to use indica-
tors of performance and more rigorous techniques of monitoring and evaluation. Surprisingly, 
many of these laudable efforts appear to overlook the need for properly controlled experimental 
design. The apparent excuse is often either that the nature of the intervention only permits an 
                                                 
18 USAID was the funder and has a long-term presence in The Philippines. Perhaps, it was not credible for the train-
ers to believe that ISSI would not wish to contract them in the future, if they were good. Which Incentives Work?       14
inadequately small number of treatment groups or a belief that it is unethical to “withhold” treat-
ment (in the case of the control groups). The results of the PREP application illustrated herein 
suggest PREP to be a rather promising approach for those donors who are serious about project 
evaluation. At the very least, PREP encourages donors to engage in better project design and to 
build data collection into project execution ex ante.  
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Table A.1 Means of performance variables (individual questions on student satisfaction 
ratings of trainer) 
Variable   Obs. Mean  Std. Dev.  Min Max 
G3.  Could you understand the lecture  262 3.59  0.563  1  4 
G4.  How loudly did the lecturer speak?     1=too softly  4=loud  259 3.65  0.523  2  4 
G5.   How easy was it to understand what the lecturer spoke about? 
explanations?  
 1=difficult…4=easy  191 3.61  0.548  2  4 
G6.  How well did the lecturer present his/her topics  260 3.42  0.638  1  4 
G7.  How well did the lecturer conduct class discussion  257 3.40  0.649  1  4 
G8.  How well did the lecturer satisfy inquiries from participants  260 3.38  0.643  2  4 
G13. What is your overall rating of the lecture  257 3.48  0.593  1  4 
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Appendix B: Trainer incentive payment schedule 
 
1$=approximately 50 pesos 
Per-Capita GDP = 45,490 Pesos in 2001. (Trainers can reasonably be assumed to be in top decile 
of income earners.  In 1997 the top decile earned twice as much as the country average). 
 
 
For 6 trainers: 
 
Dear Trainer (PERSONALIZE) 
 
We have determined on the basis of your performance in the training on the 10
th of November 
and after examining your resume to offer you some additional compensation.  PLEASE DO 
NOT DISCUSS THIS ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION WITH ANYONE.  We have tried to 
ensure that all trainers will get the same additional compensation in expected terms.   
 
You will be given 3000 Pesos in addition to the $400 that was agreed between you and ISSI.  Of 
course all compensation will be taxed. 
 
 
For 18 trainers (3 groups of 6).  Some get 20 questions, some 40, and some 80: 
 
Dear Trainer (PERSONALIZE) 
 
We have determined on the basis of your performance in the training on the 10
th of November 
and after examining your resume to offer you some additional compensation.  PLEASE DO 
NOT DISCUSS THIS ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION WITH ANYONE.  We have tried to 
ensure that all trainers will get the same additional compensation in expected terms.   
 
In addition to the $400 you agreed with ISSI your compensation will depend on the average 
performance of your class on the enclosed multiple choice questions according to the table 
below.  Of course all compensation will be taxed. 
 
Class performance  Your additional compensation 
50% or below  0 
51-55% 1000 
56-60% 2000 
61-65% 3000 
66-70% 4000 
71-75% 5000 
76-80% 6000 
81-85% 7000 
86-90% 8000 
91-95% 9000 
96-100% 10000 
 